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INTRODUCTION BY DAVID STOELTING*
The five pieces collected here reflect the remarkable maturation of international criminal
law. Only a decade ago, when the enforcement of international criminal law was a pipe
dream, the events discussed herein would have been deemed implausible. Now, with inter-
national crimes being prosecuted by a growing spectrum of national and international
courts, and with the participation of prosecutors, defense lawyers, investigators and non-
governmental organizations, international criminal law has finally emerged as a distinct
body of law with real mechanisms for enforcement.
Nothing signifies the triumph of international criminal law more than the International
Criminal Court (ICC). As most countries embrace the ICC as a long-needed answer to a
serious gap in enforcement, the United States has wrestled with its ambivalence. Jennifer
Schense and John Washburn discuss in section I the approach of the United States toward
the Court, and the PrepCom negotiations that are paving the way for the ICC to begin
operation upon the sixtieth ratification.
The ICC was a consequence of the international criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and Maury D. Schenk, Brian J. Newquist, Lesley Stone, and
Daryl A. Mundis discuss the recent activities of these tribunals in section II. Further ad hoc
tribunals have been created in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and East Timor, and these are
discussed in section III by Daryl A. Mundis. Mavis Gyamfi describes another landmark in
section IV-the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which is the
first multilateral treaty on organized crime. Finally, in section V Brian Concannon discusses
the Raboteau trial in Haiti where, following a six-week jury trial hailed by national
and international observers as fair, the impoverished justice of Haiti-against all odds-
convicted sixteen army officer and paramilitaries of human rights offenses arising from a
1994 massacre.
*David Stoelting is with Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, New York. He is Chair of the International Criminal
Law Committee of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice.
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I. The United States and the International Criminal Court
JENNIFER SCHENSE AND JOHN L. WASHBURN*
This article describes the evolution of the U.S. government's policy regarding the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC). In particular, we examine the activities of the U.S. gov-
ernment since the conclusion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, in the course of six
sessions of the U.N. Preparatory Commission for the ICC (PrepCom), and in its bilateral
and multilateral relations with other States. This article also examines the recent U.S.
signature and sets forth some considerations that may affect the approach of the Bush
administration to future negotiations relating to the ICC.
A. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
The United States identified seven flaws in the Statute for the ICC shortly after theJuly
1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference.' At the end of 1999, the United States could be rea-
sonably confident that most of these objections would be met in the coming year. Contin-
uing negotiations in the PrepCom on Rules of Procedure and Evidence and on Elements
of Crimes for the Court were making good progress toward finding solutions or compro-
mises for three of them. Of the others, the United States has simply dropped three. These
had to do with the crimes of terrorism and drug trafficking, the Statute's ban on reserva-
tions, and the self-initiating prosecutor.
The remaining objection was that the jurisdiction of the ICC must not extend to military
service members and civilian officials of the United States as long as it has not ratified the
Rome Statute. During the 1999 and 2000 PrepCom sessions, this demand continued to
overshadow the numerous and often centrally important contributions the U.S delegation
made at the PrepCom to strengthening the operations and jurisprudence of the Court.
By the end of the Rome diplomatic conference, this position had emerged as the re-
mainder of earlier and unsuccessful American efforts at broad control of the Court. These
had included, for example, an attempt to make the U.N. Security Council the sole source
of cases for the ICC. On its last day, the conference definitively rejected a U.S. proposal to
deny jurisdiction to the Court over "acts... committed by officials or agents of a State not
party in the course of official duties and acknowledged by the State as such"2 unless that
State had consented.
The delegation also carried over from Rome, and into the 1999 and 2000 sessions, two
distinct styles in the conduct of their diplomacy. The first was conventional-and often
very skillful-multilateral diplomacy, employing the usual techniques of initiating and ex-
changing texts, searching for compromises that avoided papering over real disagreements
in favor of results the Court could use, and emphasizing cooperation with others for a
*Jennifer Schense is legal adviser to the Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International
Criminal Court. John L. Washburn is Co-Chair of the Washington Working Group on the ICC and convener
of the American NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and are not attributable to their organizations.
1. See Developments at the Rome Treaty Conference: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
106th Cong., July 23, 1998 (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and
Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent
International Criminal Court).
2. Proposal Submitted by the United States ofAmerica to the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90 (1998).
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common purpose. This was often backed up by formidable expertise and thorough prep-
aration. The admiration and respect it created considerably offset the resentment and im-
patience aroused by the second approach.
The second approach combined a hard and continuous push for an exemption with a
search for concessions that might allow Washington to reconsider the need for it. This was
an obviously contradictory combination. The possibility of an American signature was
raised more and more openly as another inducement for concessions in the last two
PrepCom sessions in this period. By the beginning of 1999, most delegations had come to
believe that neither an exemption nor any reconsideration in Washington would ever hap-
pen. Moreover, they were increasingly irritated by U.S. demands for concessions to which
it was now clear there would never be any return.
B. FOURTH SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION (MARCH 13-31, 2000)
At the fourth PrepCom session, delegates began to focus in earnest on the completion
of the draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes with the June
30, 2000 deadline established by the Final Act of the Rome Conference drawing nearer.
The U.S. delegation continued to remain actively engaged in the negotiations, especially
in drafting the Elements of Crimes. The United States had successfully insisted at the Rome
Conference that the PrepCom should be charged with drafting the elements.
Delegations were also further encouraged by the provisional resolution of some of the
issues raised by U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer as being of "fundamental concern to
the United States." Among those issues resolved were the elements for the war crime of
the direct or indirect transfer of civilian populations into occupied territories. Both the U.S.
and Israeli delegations were concerned about what they viewed as an undue extension of
international law beyond that contained in the Geneva Conventions. After months of in-
tense negotiations, delegations on all sides were able to reach agreement on a set of elements
that mirror exactly the definition of the crime in the Rome Statute, while allowing sufficient
flexibility to adapt to possible changes either in international law or in the political situation
concerned. Resolution was also achieved on a provision of Article 12, which required clar-
ification. Article 12(3), as worded, allows a non-State party to temporarily accept the Court's
jurisdiction for purposes of "the crime in question." The PrepCom accepted a Bosnian
proposal that clarified that such acceptance would apply to "all crimes of relevance to the
situation," thus meeting a widely shared concern that the use of the word crime alone might
allow some States to use the Court to prosecute political enemies while denying the Court's
jurisdiction over their own crimes.
The primary issue for the U.S. delegation, however, remained unresolved, and delegates
could not begin to determine how to approach it. On the strength of pressure from the
Department of Defense to maintain the U.S. position and without any clear signal from
The White House, the U.S. delegation continued to seek a total exemption for U.S. na-
tionals. It was widely anticipated that the U.S. delegation would at least informallyintroduce
a proposal to achieve this exemption at the March session of the PrepCom. However, the
U.S. delegation did not circulate any language. Instead, Ambassador Scheffer met infor-
mally but systematically with heads of delegations to sound out support for two mechanisms,
which he hoped Washington would accept as constituting an exemption: a rule procedure
based on Article 98 and the addition of text to the relationship agreement between the U.N.
and the ICC. The purpose of the rule was to allow the Court to enter into agreements with
States to limit surrender of individuals to the Court. The relationship agreement, as an
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agreement between the Court and the United Nations, would then include language to
create an exemption from surrender to the Court of officials and military personnel of the
United States and of other non-State parties to the Court. At the end of the March session,
the U.S. delegation demonstrated its intention to pursue both the rule and the text for the
relationship agreement through a footnote attached to the rolling text at the last minute.'
Most delegates could not support the idea of a complete exemption for American na-
tionals. Many agreed that both the proposed rule and text for the relationship agreement
were not legally justified and would be harmful to the Statute and to the Court. Many also
resented the insistence of the United States in obtaining the exemption without regard to
the serious damage it would do to the credibility and effectiveness of the Court. Nonethe-
less, it was difficult for them to resist the political pressure exerted on countries in their
capitals to concede to the United States, and the tactical maneuvering of the U.S. delegation
in the PrepCom.
The results of the fourth PrepCom session touched off intense but largely inconclusive
discussions within the Clinton administration. These reached sub-cabinet working groups
and apparently involved the Secretaries of Defense and State as well. Regional bureaus
within the State Department became extensively engaged in the ICC issue for the first time,
giving the State Department's participation in inter-agency debates unprecedented depth
and vigor. The State Department was finally authorized to pursue the Article 98 approach,
but was not allowed to offer even signature as an inducement. This outcome was publicly
expressed in a letter to other governments by Madeleine Albright.4
3. The footnote simply read, "One delegation may propose an addition to the rule related to article 98."
Addendum, Annex II: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(9)/RT.I, at 6 (Mar.
21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/mar2000/english/revl ad le.pdf.
4. The letter from U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to foreign ministers around the world, calling
for support of the U.S. position, dated April 17, 2000, is part of the archives of the Coalition for the Inter-
national Criminal Court. The text of the letter reads as follows:
17 April 2000
Dear Mr. Minister:
I am writing to you at this time to emphasize the critical importance we attach to our proposal for the
proposed International Criminal Court (ICC). We are seeking a provision in the UN/ICC relationship
agreement and a Rule to Article 98 of the Rome Statute to address our fundamental objective to prevent,
unless certain conditions are met, the surrender or acceptance by the ICC for trial of nationals of non-
party States who are acting under governmental direction and whose actions are acknowledged as such
by the non-party State.
We must achieve, before it is too late, the proper balance between the noble aims of the ICC treaty,
namely, to bring to justice perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes,
and the continuing need for responsible nations to maintain or restore international peace and security
and to undertake humanitarian missions. We believe our proposal advances both goals with non-
parties and with parties to the ICC Treaty. Yet, it would still make it extremely difficult for individuals
from rogue states to act with impunity. Our proposal is consistent with Article 98 and is not an
amendment or modification of the Rome Statute. If our proposal is adopted by the U.N. Preparatory
Commission on the ICC this year, it would address the fundamental concern that leads U.S. to oppose
the treaty and would enable U.S. to assist the ICC as appropriate. The end result would be a stronger
ICC that would benefit from a relationship with the United States. It also would give U.S. time to
evaluate the treaty regime and the Court's operation before making a final decision about our partic-
ipation in the Court.
There is too much at stake for international justice and international peace to go down a path that
would drive a wedge between the United States and the ICC. I strongly urge you to support our
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The letter backfired with its most important recipients because it seemed to push a
position on Article 98 that had already been rejected at the end of the fourth session.
Moreover, the letter used the language of the proposal that had been so soundly defeated
in Rome. Many read it as a threat of continued American opposition to the Rome Statute.
Nonetheless, the letter became the basis for instructions for strenuous demarches on this
position by individual envoys in capitals worldwide and by U.S. delegations at multilateral
meetings. Many of the latter were regional, such as conferences between the United States
and the European Union.
C. FIFTH SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION (JUNE 12-30, 2000)
As a result of these discussions with other countries, the U.S. delegation approached the
fifth session of the PrepCom with the realization that their full proposal was generating
strong opposition among the Like-Minded Group of States (LMG) and, in particular, the
European Union (EU). This was accompanied by the realization that time was quickly
running out if any exemption was to be achieved through the Rules and Elements.
The U.S. approach changed tactically but not substantively in June. The United States
set aside the exemption language for the relationship agreement and began to press for only
the rule, arguing that alone it was harmless. The United States formally introduced a new
text of the rule at the start of the fifth session. 6 These activities caused some confusion
proposal as the June session of the preparatory commission approaches, and to instruct your delegation
accordingly. In any event, we would appreciate your consulting U.S. prior to making any final decision




5. The LMG developed as an informal government grouping in 1995, during the Ad Hoc Committee of
the General Assembly created to address the ICC. What started out as a group of approximately six or seven
States at the start of the Ad Hoc Committee grew to include close to twenty like-minded States by the end of
1995, including Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Lesotho, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and Trinidad and Tobago. The LMG coalesced around a very specific initial goal: to advance the
negotiations in the face of P-5 and other efforts to sidetrack the process by obtaining a recommendation of
the Ad Hoc Committee that the General Assembly create a preparatory committee, with a view towards
establishing a date as soon as possible for a diplomatic conference. The core membership of what came to be
called the Like-Minded Group of States (LMG) emerged as early debates revealed similarities among dele-
gations on key issues, including the court's jurisdiction and how that jurisdiction would be triggered, and what
should constitute the Statute's core crimes. Eventually, the impact of the LMG's coordination, together with
that of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, has a decisive, constructive impact on the outcome
of the Rome Conference. For a more detailed description of the evolution of the LMG, see the chapter on the
role of NGOs in the development of the Rome Statute by Jennifer Schense and William Pace, part of a
commentary edited by Antonio Cassese, due for publication in 2001.
6. See Proposal Submitted by the United States of America Concerning Rules of Procedure and Evidence Relating to
Part 9 of the Statute (International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance): Proposed Rule to Article 98, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(9)/DP.4 (2000), available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/us2000.html (unofficial
version; official version on file with the U.N. and the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court).
The U.S. delegation also introduced a proposal relating to Part 13 of the Rome Statute that would require
the approval of both the State of nationality of the accused and the State upon whose territory the crime was
committed in order to proceed with investigations and prosecutions of crimes added by amendment to the
Rome Statute. Such a provision would be contrary to Article 12 of the Statute, which requires the permission
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because it was clear from the April and May demarches that the United States required
both the rule and the relationship agreement text to achieve an exemption. Nonetheless,
the United States put forth only the rule in June and asked that it be considered "on its
own merits."
Efforts to prevent the U.S. rule from being accepted were unfortunately made more
difficult by the all-or-nothing environment building at the PrepCom. The PrepCom bureau
flatly opposed a vote on the Rules and Elements because of the belief that while a rule to
Article 98 would alone be harmless, the possibility of adoption of the Rules and Elements
by anything less than consensus would reflect disagreement about their universal accepta-
bility and slow the momentum of ratifications. The LMG followed suit. This encouraged
the United States not to concede on the rule or to let up the political pressure. A few
delegates held out for a vote, but in the end succumbed to the pressure to accept the rule
and to adopt both the Rules and Elements by consensus. This consensus, however, could
only be achieved if the rule was accompanied by a warning in the summary of the session's
proceedings that the rule was indeed stand-alone and could not be linked to the relationship
agreement or any similar agreement in the future.7 The chair of the PrepCom (in his
capacity as head of the Canadian delegation), Portugal (on behalf of the EU), and many
members of the LMG spoke after the adoption of the text to emphasize that there would
be no re-opening of the Rome Statute. It was clear, however, from public and private
statements of members of the U.S. delegation as of October 2000 that the strenuous cam-
paign for a U.S. exemption would continue.'
Preparations in Washington before the sixth session of the PrepCom had a feverish and
desperate quality. Supporters of the ICC within the administration, especially in the State
Department, saw the opportunity to sign the Statute slipping away. A full confrontation
with the Defense Department was avoided with the latter's grudging agreement to let the
delegation try to put together a combination of measures that would collectively provide
for full exemption. Since this agreement came very late and the multiple proposals in the
U.S. position made it difficult to advocate forcefully, American international activity in
support of it, including bilateral demarches, was comparatively slight.
of only one of the two categories of States. This proposal has been interpreted as reflecting U.S. delegation
concerns about eventual inclusion of the crime of aggression. As mentioned in the section of this report
addressing aggression, further discussion of the U.S. proposal has been postponed until a more appropriate
time, most specifically when the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of States Parties are negotiated.
7. The rule reads, "The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a person without the
consent of a sending State if, under article 98, paragraph 2, such a request would be inconsistent with obligations
under an international agreement pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required prior to the
surrender of a person of that State to the Court." Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add.l, at 89 (Rule 195) (2000). The proviso in the session summary reads, "It
was generally understood that rule 9.19 [renumbered as rule 195] should not be interpreted as requiring or in
any way calling for the negotiation of provisions in any particular international agreement by the Court or by
any other international organization or State." Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Its Fifh Session, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.3/Rev.I, at 3 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/jun2000/
5thdocs.htm.
8. To name a few press sources in which the U.S. delegation's intentions are made clear, see U.S. Gains a
Compromise on War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2000; 100 Countries Approve War Tribunal, AP
ONLINE, June 30, 2000, at http://www.ap.org; U.S., Opponents Claim Win on International Court, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, June 30, 2000; War Crimes Court Ratified by Canada; U.S. Battles to Keep Citizens Erempt from Prosecution,
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 1, 2000; U.S. Wins Time to Protect Forces from War-Crimes Panel, WASH. TIMES,
July 1, 2000; Official Outlines U.S. Strategy on War-Crimes Court, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 2, 2000.
VOL. 35, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 619
D. SIXTH SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION (NOVEMBER 27-DECEMBER 8, 2000)
The working environment at the sixth session of the PrepCom was overshadowed by the
approaching December 31, 2000, deadline for signature of the Rome Statute. By the start
of the sixth session, twenty-three countries had ratified the Rome Statute, a fact underscored
by the announcement on the first day of the session that South Africa had ratified; that
number would rise to twenty-seven by the end of the year. In addition, two States-the
Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates-announced on the first day that they
had signed and Peru announced that its signature was imminent. An additional twenty-two
States would sign the Statute before the deadline, bringing the final number of signatories
up to 139. 9
Speculation among delegates was rife that the United States might sign the Statute before
the deadline. This was not the first time the possibility was openly addressed: Ambassador
Scheffer had encouraged delegates to believe that he might be able to persuade President
Clinton to sign, if the U.S. delegation received concessions in the texts of the Rules and
the Elements, amounting to an exemption. However, this possibility never had its desired
effect on other delegates at the PrepCom because they recognized that they could not
concede what the U.S. delegation would require to successfully make its case for signature
in Washington.
The U.S. delegation continued to seek a full exemption from the PrepCom, focusing
primarily on the relationship agreement text. To achieve this, the first proposal addressed
Article 10 of the draft relationship agreement, apparently seeking to interpose the United
Nations between non-State parties and the Court as the conduit for documentation about
admissibility of specific cases. 10 Seventeen other delegations spoke strongly against this
proposal because of the likelihood that transmittal of information through the Security
Council could effectively delay admissibility determinations and hamper the work of the
Court. The rolling text of the draft agreement omits this proposal; however, the United
States did succeed in having a footnote attached calling for future consideration of how to
address transmission of information relating to the surrender of U.N. peacekeepers."I
On the last day of the working group on the relationship agreement, the United States
introduced a second proposal, DP.17, calling for the addition of a new article to the draft
agreement.'" This article reflects most closely the original U.S. proposal for the relationship
9. It should be here noted that 120 States voted to adopt the Rome Statute at the close of the Rome
Diplomatic Conference, a figure that was a goalpost for NGOs, governments, and others promoting signature
of the Statute.
10. Proposal Submitted by the United States ofAmerica: Comments on Document, PCNICC/2OOO/WGICC-UN/
L.I, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.12 (Dec. 6,2000), available from the U.N. Office of Doc-
ument Services and on file with the International NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court.
11. Footnote 12 states, "Some delegations suggested that it would be useful to include somewhere in the
present Agreement a provision dealing with the transmission of information to the United Nations by the
Court regarding a request for surrender of any member of United Nations peacekeepers when the Court deems
it appropriate." See Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/RT. 1
(Dec. 7, 2000). Due to a lack of active U.S. participation in the February/March 2001 PrepCom to support
this element, this footnote was subsequently dropped from the draft agreement, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/
L.1/Rev.1/Add.l. Both documents are available from the U.N. and are on file with the NGO Coalition for
the International Criminal Court.
12. See U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/-WGICC-UN/DP.17 (Dec. 7, 2000). Proposal Submitted by the United
States ofAmerica: Comments on Document, PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/2.1I-Proposal for a new article.
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agreement, which the LMG and the EU so soundly rejected leading into the fifth session
of the PrepCom.15 However, because it was introduced on the last day, there was no time
to discuss it. This proposal and others were added to the rolling text of the relationship
agreement as an annex, with the note that: "Owing to the lack of time, the Working Group
deferred consideration of the following proposals to the next session." The Coordinator
further stressed during the final plenary that there was no priority given to the proposals
contained in the Annex, but that they were included simply because they were introduced
during the last session and had not been discussed by the Working Group.
Also on the last day, the United States submitted a third proposal to the plenary that was
neither formally introduced nor discussed. This proposal requested an extension of the
PrepCom's mandate in order to consider the development of factors for the Court that
may be relevant for the investigation, prosecution, and surrender of suspects, including the
context within which an alleged crime has occurred and a State's contribution to interna-
tional peace and security. The United States intended for these two eleventh-hour proposals
to effectively result in a near-total exemption for American nationals. It would, of course,
also similarly benefit the nationals of other countries, which could meet the criteria required
by the proposals.14 The Working Group on the Relationship Agreement will address DR 17;
the second proposal will be dealt with by Zsolt Hetesy of Hungary, the PrepCom Bureau's
contact point for the headquarters agreement. The Bureau encouraged delegations to share
any comments or suggestions regarding the U.S. proposal with the contact point; therefore,
responses from delegations to this proposal will likely shape the Bureau's decision as to the
framework in which this proposal will ultimately be addressed.
Finally, a number of delegations discussed the possibility of an extension of Article 124
of the Rome Statute to States having signed the Rome Statute but not having ratified. The
effect of such an extension would be to exempt the governments, but not the nationals, of
non-State parties from the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes for the first seven years
after entry into force. However, there was limited support for this proposal; moreover, the
U.S. delegation did not consider it a full exemption, so the idea was eventually dropped.
E. CLINTON SIGNS THE ROME STATUTE
The Rome Statute closed for signature at midnight on December 31, 2000. The United
States, along with Israel and Iran, signed a few hours before this deadline. Ambassador
Scheffer signed the Statute on behalf of the U.S. government. President Clinton's decision
13. The text of the proposal reads as follows:
In order to encourage contributions by States to promote international peace and security, and unless
there has been a referral to the Court pursuant to article 13(b) of the Statute, the United Nations and
the Court agree that the Court shall determine on its own motion pursuant to article 19(1) the ad-
missibility of a case in accordance with article 17 when there is a request for the surrender of a suspect
who is charged in such case with a crime that occurred outside the territory of the suspect's State of
nationality.
Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, supra note 6.
14. The effect of the two proposals together would likely be to require the Court only to evaluate a State's
ability to exercise complementarity, and not a State's willingness to do so, as required by Article 17 of the
Rome Statute. However, it should be noted that as long as this decision rests in the hands of the judges, even
this drastic step would not result in the 100 percent exemption, which the U.S. Department of Defense de-
mands.
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to sign, unlike some of his other last-minute moves, did not preempt any action that his
successor might take and had been long and thoroughly debated within his administration.
This debate began immediately after the end of the sixth session of the PrepCom. Op-
ponents, especially in the Department of Defense, declared that nothing should undercut
the demand for exemption and future efforts to achieve it. Proponents argued that the
Clinton administration had supported the principle of an international criminal court con-
sistently since 1995 and that signature would be a closing confirmation of this support. 5
By early November, the Clinton administration was receiving appeals for signature from
many sources. Non-governmental organizations and individuals approached every office
and individual concerned with the ICC in the administration and some organizations with
nationwide memberships mounted effective letter-writing campaigns. These campaigns cul-
minated in the delivery of a selection of these letters in person to the president. Letters to
the president also came in from Congress, religious organizations and leaders, distinguished
human rights activists, and persons prominent in other fields. Heads of state and govern-
ment from other countries, American notables, and personal friends called or visited him
to urge signature.
Finally, newspapers across the country editorialized in favor of signature. Their general
approach was that the United States should not turn its back on the Court and should use
signature to retain American influence over the final stages of shaping and establishing
the ICC.
In the end, this approach is also reflected in the official statement accompanying the U.S.
signature. However, this document bears the marks of the contention that dominated debate
within the U.S. government until the very end. The statement repeats the concern that the
ICC must not have jurisdiction over nationals of states not party to the Statute so that the
United States can observe the Court in its formative years before choosing to become
subject to its jurisdiction. In this way, the statement fails to dispel the longstanding con-
fusion within the U.S. government about the Court's jurisdiction over individuals, not over
states. It also refers to other unspecified flaws in the Statute, but leaves it to the incoming
administration to meet these concerns and advises that until that is done, the Rome Statute
should not be submitted to the Senate for ratification.
F. CONCLUSION
As this article was written, the Bush administration was considering its long-term policy
toward the ICC. At the seventh session of the PrepCom, from February 26 to March of
2001, the United States absented itself except for the working group on aggression. The
style and substance of American participation in the work before the PrepCom in Septem-
ber 2001 will establish the boundaries of American policy and limit the options of those
who make it. Will the new government feel bound to signal its disapproval of the Clinton
signature as strongly in this international forum as it has domestically? Will it wish to
participate in shaping the Court through its positions on such issues as the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Assembly of States Parties, the Court's financial regulations and rules, and
its relations with the U.N.? Finally, the new Secretary of State has made clear that his
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
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administration even more sternly insists on exemption than its predecessor. His delegation
is likely to discover at the eighth session of the PrepCom, if not before, that the nations
traditionally allied to the United States are precisely those that will continue to put ex-
emption out of reach.
II. International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
MAURY D. SHENK, BRIAN J. NEWQUIST, LESLEY STONE, AND DARYL A. MUNDIS*
This section summarizes the significant developments that occurred during 2000 relating
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).16
A. STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO THE ICTY AND ICTR
The Statutes of the ICTY17 and the ICTRIs were amended in 2000 with the goal of
substantially reducing the lengths of trials conducted before the Tribunals. These amend-
ments were the culmination of a process begun in 1998,19 when the U.N. General Assembly
requested the Secretary-General to establish an expert group to review the effective opera-
tion and functioning of the ad hoc Tribunals.2°
On November 22, 1999, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly the
expert group's report, 21 containing forty-six recommendations for improving the efficiency
of the Tribunals. Following the release of the expert group report, the General Assembly
*Maury D. Shenk, Brian J. Newquist and Lesley Stone are attorneys in the Washington, D.C. office of
Steptoe & Johnson LLP. Daryl A. Mundis is a Legal Officer with the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not attributable to the United Nations, ICTY, or
the Office of the Prosecutor.
16. For information regarding earlier developments at the ICTY and ICTR, see Douglas Stringer, Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 INT'L LAW. 611 (1997); Monroe Leigh & Maury Shenk,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 32 INT'L LAW. 509 (1998); Maury Shenk et al., Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 33 INT'L LAW. 549 (1999); Maury Shenk
et al., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 34 INT'L LAW. 683 (2000). The
recent, extremely significant surrender of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY by the Serbian government will be
discussed in a similar article next year.
17. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The full text of the statute with
current amendments is available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
18. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). Text of the statute is available
at http://www.ictr.org [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
19. For a more detailed account of this process, see Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation andFunctioning
of the International Criminal Tribunals, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 759 (2000).
20. See G.A. Res. 53/212, U.N. GOAR, 53rd Sess., 5th Comm., Annex, Agenda Item 135, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/53/212 (1998); G.A. Res. 53/213, U.N. GOAR, 53rd Sess., 5th Comm., Annex, Agenda Item 137, U.N.
Doc. A/53/213 (Dec. 18, 1998).
21. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. Financing of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory ofRwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsiblefor Genocide
and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December
1994, U.N. GOAR, 54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 142 and 143, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (1999).
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requested comments from the Tribunals on the recommendations proposed by the expert
group. 22
Shortly after these comments were submitted, ICTY President Jorda presented a report
to the General Assembly and Security Council on behalf of the ICTY Chambers.2 3 The
plan set forth in his report contained three primary elements and was designed to greatly
reduce the length of pre-trial detention faced by the accused at the ICTY First, the Security
Council should consider amending the ICTY Statute to include ad litem (or ad hoc) judges.
Second, in order to expedite appeals, the ICTY Statute should be amended to increase the
number of appellate judges. Third, the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE)
should be amended to permit the Trial Chambers to delegate more authority to the cham-
bers' senior legal officers for the management of the pre-trial phase of the pending cases.
On November 30, 2000, in response to this ICTY proposal, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1329,24 amending the statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR, and generally fol-
lowing the plan submitted by President Jorda, with the exception of the amendments to
the ICTY RPE.25
Resolution 1329 amended the ICTY Statute, creating twenty-seven new ad litem judges
and expanding the Appeals Chamber to seven judges, thereby increasing the composition
of the chambers from fourteen to sixteen permanent judges.26 The ad litem judges will be
assigned exclusively to the Trial Chambers in accordance with strict statutory guidelines.
Only nine ad litem judges may serve at any one time and no more than six may be assigned
to any one Trial Chamber." Once ad litem judges are assigned, each Trial Chamber would
be split into either two or three sections,2 each of which will contain three judges.29 Each
section must be composed of both permanent and ad litem judges, in order to ensure that
each section benefits from the experience of the permanent judges3o It is anticipated that
once the ad litem judges are appointed, the ICTY will be able to conduct six trials simul-
taneously. This will expedite the trials for those accused currently in pre-trial detention
awaiting trial.
22. See G.A. Res. 54/239, U.N. GOAR 5th Comm., 54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 142, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/54/239 (2000); G.A. Res. 54/240, U.N. GOAR 5th Comm., 54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 143, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/54/240 (2000).
23. See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GOAR,
55th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 52, U.N. Doc. A/55/382-S/2000/865 (2000). This report is also available on
the ICTY website, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm.
24. S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000). Articles 12-14 of the ICTY
Statute were amended, while Article 13bis, Article 13ter and Article 13quarter were added. Articles 11-13 of the
ICTR Statute were amended. The amended articles are included as Annex I (ICTY) and Annex II (ICTR) to
Resolution 1329.
25. Article 15 of the ICTY Statute vests in the judges the authority to adopt and amend the RPE. Thus,
that part of President Jorda's proposal relating to amendments to the RPE to expand the responsibilities of
the chambers' senior legal officers will be addressed at a future plenary of the ICTY judges.
26. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 12; ICTR Statute, supra note 18, art. 1 (b). Pursuant to ICTR Statute
art. 13(4), the two ad hoc Tribunals share a common Appeals Chamber.
27. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 12.
28. Depending on whether that Trial Chamber is assigned three or six ad litem Judges. It is likely that each
Trial Chamber will be split into two sections, however.
29. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 12(2).
30. See id.
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The ad litem judges, like the permanent judges, are elected for a term of four years, and
enjoy the same terms and conditions of service and privileges and immunities as the per-
manent judges." Although ad litem judges are not eligible for re-election (unlike the per-
manent judges),32 they may serve on multiple trials for a cumulative period not to exceed
three years." Furthermore, ad litem judges may not vote for or serve as president of the
ICTY or as Presiding Judge of a Trial Chamber,34 participate in the adoption of the
RPE,35 review an indictment,6 consult with the president regarding the assignment of
judges or in relation to a pardon or commutation of a sentence,37 or adjudicate in pre-trial
proceedings."
The Security Council also amended the ICTY and ICTR Statutes to increase the Appeals
Chamber from five to seven judges. However, for each appeal the Appeals Chamber will
continue to be composed of five members? 9 The two new additional Appeals Chamber
judges are to be drawn from the ICTR.40
B. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
1. Status of Proceedings
By the end of 2000, the ICTY had publicly indicted ninety-seven individuals. 41 Thirty-
five of the accused were in custody in the ICTY detention unit, four had been provisionally
released, and twenty-seven arrest warrants remained outstanding. 42 Proceedings against five
accused had been completed . 3 Eleven accused were before the Appeals Chamber; twelve
were before the Trial Chambers; and sixteen were in pre-trial stages.-
Two trials were concluded in 2000. In Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and Others, five members of
the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) were found guilty of crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws or customs of war in connection with their role in the attack on the
31. See id. art. l3quarter(I).
32. Compare ICTY Statute art. 13bis(3) with ICTY Statute art. l3ter(l)(e).
33. ICTY Statute art. 13ter(2).
34. ICTY Statute art. l3quarter(2)(a).
35. ICTY Statute art. l3quarter(2)(b)(i).
36. ICTY Statute art. l3quarter(2)(b)(ii).
37. ICTY Statute art. l3quarter(2)(b)(iii).
38. ICTY Statute art. l3quarter(2)(b)(iv).
39. ICTY Statute art. 12(3); ICTR Statute art. 11 (b).
40. ICTY Statute art. 13(3); ICTR Statute art. 14(4).
41. Undisclosed indictments may also exist. See ICTY Key Figures, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-
e.htm (modified Jan. 10, 2001).
42. See Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (modified Jan. 10,
2001).
43. Proceedings have been completed against: Drazen Erdemovic (pled guilty on January 14, 1998 to one
count of a violation of the laws or customs of war and sentenced to five years' imprisonment), Dragan Papic
(found not guilty of one count of a crime against humanity on January 14, 2000 and released immediately),
Dusko Tadic (found guilty of five counts of violations of the laws or customs of war and six counts of crimes
against humanity and sentenced ultimately to a maximum of twenty years' imprisonment on January 26, 2000),
Zlatko Aleksovski (found guilty on one count of a violation of the laws or customs of war and ultimately
sentenced to seven years' imprisonment on March 24, 2000), and Anto Furundzija (found guilty of two counts
of violations of the laws or customs of war and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, which was upheld on
appeal on July 21, 2000). See id.
44. See id.
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village of Ahmici in Central Bosnia.45 A sixth defendant, Dragan Papic, was acquitted on
the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.46
In Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Tihomir Blaskic, a general in the HVO, was found guilty by virtue
of individual and superior responsibility on three counts of crimes against humanity, six
counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and ten counts of violations of the
laws of war.4 Blaskic received the longest term of imprisonment to date-forty-five years. 41
Also in the year 2000, on December 11, Hans Holthuis (The Netherlands) was appointed
Registrar.49 Holthuis took office on January 1, 2001. Holthuis was Chief Public Prosecutor
and Head of the National Office of the Public Prosecutor's Service of The Netherlands
before taking his position at the ICTY.5 °
2. Legal Developments
a. Power to Subpoena SFOR
On October 18, 2000, the Trial Chamber issued a decision on a motion for judicial
assistance by defendant Todorovic compelling the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and SFOR's
thirty-three participating States to produce evidence pertaining to Todorovic's arrest. 51 To-
dorovic claimed that he was illegally detained,5" and he filed a motion seeking discovery of
a variety of evidence from SFOR to support this claim. 5"
The prosecution argued that even if the arrest were irregular, it would not justify the
defendant's release. The prosecution also argued that laws compelling disclosure of
materials were not binding on SFOR because they were designed to regulate conduct be-
tween states.
5 4
In its decision on Todorovic's motion, the Trial Chamber discussed Article 29 of the
ICTY Statute, which requires States to cooperate with the Tribunal by producing evi-
dence," and reasoned that on its face, Article 29 "applied to all States, whether acting
individually or collectively. In principle, there is no reason why Article 29 should not apply
to collective enterprises undertaken by States, in the framework of international organisa-
tions and, in particular, their competent organs such as SFOR in the present case. 56
The Trial Chamber concluded that it had the authority to issue a binding order to the
thirty-three States participating in SFOR under Article 29, and through SFOR's responsible
45. See Judicial Supplement 11, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and Others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/Supplement/suppl 1-e/kupreskic.htm (Jan. 14, 2000) (last visited Jan. 21, 2001) at 2
[hereinafter Judicial Supplement I l].
46. See id. at 7.
47. See Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, supra note 42, at 4.
48. See Law of War: Tribunal Metes Out Harshest Sentence to Croatian General, INr'L ENFORCEMENr L. REP.,
Apr. 2000, at Al.
49. See ICTY Press Release, Henry Hans Holtbuis IsAppointed as Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (Dec. 12, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p548-e.htm.
50. See id.
51. See Prosecutor v. Simic and Others, Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be
Provided by SFOR and Others, (Oct. 18, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/decision-e/
01018EV513778.htm [hereinafter Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance].
52. Todorovic alleged that mercenaries abducted him in Serbia and delivered him to SFOR at the Bosnian
border. See Jerome Socolovsky, U.S. Opposes Tribunal's Subpoena, AP ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2000, at http://
www.ap.org.
53. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance, supra note 51, at 9.
54. See id. 14-15.
55. See id. 37, quoting Article 29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal (as amended May 13, 1998).
56. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance, supra note 51, at 46.
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authority (the North Atlantic Council), to SFOR itself." The Trial Chamber rejected
SFOR's blanket claim that disclosure was precluded by the need for operational security.
The Trial Chamber further decided that it was competent to subpoena SFOR personnel,
including U.S. General Eric Shinseki, since, for the sake of the decision, he was not rep-
resenting his state and should be treated "qua individual in respect of any event that he has
personally witnessed, even if observed while performing his official functions."58 The pros-
ecutor filed an appeal, and eight states and NATO filed requests for review.59 However,
before the appeal was heard, Todorovic pled guilty to one count of the indictment.60
b. Stare Decisis
In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, the Appeals Chamber formally recognized the principle of stare
decisis.61 At the trial level, the accused had been acquitted on two counts of grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions because the Trial Chamber had found that Article 2 of the
Statute, which requires that the conflict be international and that the crimes affect protected
persons, did not apply. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the Trial Chamber did not
use the "overall control" test set out in the Tadic case for establishing the international
character of the armed conflict.62
The Appeals Chamber noted that the need for consistency, stability, and predictability
was especially strong in the context of criminal law, where individual liberty is at stake. 61
Noting that there was no provision in the ICTY Statute that dealt with stare decisis, the
Tribunal examined the practice in common and civil law jurisdictions and found that both
generally apply the principle. The Appeals Chamber determined that "in the interests of
certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions, but
should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice. 64
The Appeals Chamber further determined that its decisions are binding on Trial Cham-
bers, but the decisions of a Trial Chamber have no binding force on other Trial Chambers
although a Trial Chamber is free to follow another's decision if it finds it persuasive.
5
Following these principles, the Appeals Chamber determined that the Trial Chamber
had misapplied the Tadic "overall control" test, but declined to reverse the verdict of ac-
quittal because doing so would not have affected the defendant's sentence.
c. The T Quoque Defense
The tu quoque defense is an argument that obligations under international law are recip-
rocal, and a party is entitled to violate its obligations if violations are being committed by
the enemy.66 In Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and Others, the Trial Chamber rejected the tu quoque
57. See id. 91 58.
58. Id. 9 62.
59. See Submissions Filed Regarding Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance (Nov. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/news/Simic/simic-cd.htm(last visited June 5, 2001).
60. The plea was accepted on January 19, 2001. See id.
61. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement (Mar. 24, 2000), available at http://
www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/judgement/ale-asjOO0324e.pdf,at 191 92-114.
62. The "overall control" test is discussed in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-A, udgement (July 15,
1999) at T 156.
63. See Aleksovski, supra note 61, at 197.
64. Id. 1 107.
65. See id. 91 112.
66. See Judicial Supplement 11, supra note 45, at 2.
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defense and concluded that the defendants' attacks against the Muslim population were not
justified by similar attacks of Muslim forces against the Croatian population. The Tribunal
held that the body of law it applies is not based on a system of bilateral obligations and
reciprocity, but rather on obligations that are absolute and unconditional.
67
d. Persecution
Also in the Kupreskic case, the Trial Chamber discussed the crime of persecution, which
it defined as a "gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right,
laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the
other acts prohibited in Article 5."6s The actus reus of persecution generally consists of a
series of acts or omissions. The mens rea of persecution is distinguishable from that of
genocide in that genocide requires the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the victims'
group. The Trial Chamber noted that, "from the viewpoint of mens rea, genocide is an
extreme and most inhuman form of persecution.
'6 9
e. Provisional Release Granted to Two Defendants
For the first time in the ICTY's history, two defendants were released pending trial.70
The defendants, Simo Zaric and Miroslav Tadic, had voluntarily surrendered to the Tri-
bunal.7I They are each charged with two counts of crimes against humanity and one count
of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.72 The Rule of Procedure and Evidence re-
garding release pending trial had been amended in November of 1999, so that exceptional
circumstances were no longer among the criteria required for release."
C. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
The ICTR made significant progress on numerous fronts in 2000. In addition to securing
new convictions and concluding several appeals, the Tribunal significantly improved its
relationship with the Rwandan government. The Tribunal began the year under a cloud of
severely strained relations with the Rwandan government in the aftermath of the Appeals
Chamber's 1999 decision to dismiss charges against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza.14 However,
in March 2000, the Appeals Chamber quashed the earlier ruling and reinstated charges
against Barayagwiza, which the Rwandan government saluted as a "victory for victims. " 5
Subsequently, the ICTR successfully took numerous steps to repair and improve its rela-
tionships with the Rwandan government and citizens. In 2000, ICTR judges for the first
67. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and Others, Case No. IT-95-16, Judgement (Jan. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/udgement/kup-tj0001 14e-l.htm,at T 517.
68. Id. 9] 621.
69. Id. 636.
70. Prior to this, defendants had been released only due to illness or to mourn family members. See Law of
War: Tribunal Will Grant Bail to Two Defendants, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., June 2000, at C5.
71. See Judicial Supplement 14, Prosecutor v. Simic and Others, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
Supplemenr/suppl4-e/simic2.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2001) at 1.
72. See Prosecutor v. Simic and Others, Case No. IT-95-9, Second Amended Indictment (Mar. 25, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sim-2ai98121 le.
73. Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence governs provisional release. See id.
74. For a summary of this November 3, 1999 decision and reactions to it, see Maury Shenk et al.,International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia andfor Rwanda, 34 INT'L LAw. 683 (2000).
75. See Coalition for International Justice, Barayagwiza to Face Trial (Mar. 31, 2000), at http://www.cij.org/
content.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2001).
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time agreed to. requests by the Rwandan government to personally visit crime scenes.76
More significantly, the ICTR's chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, announced that she will
ask the Trial Chambers to hold future hearings in Rwanda, and that in the future "it might
even be possible to... [move] the entire Tribunal to Kigali."77 Furthermore, in September
2000 the ICTR opened an information and outreach center in Kigali, which will house a
public information area, documents repository and legal library, and will manage the Vic-
tims Assistance Programme."8
The improved relations between the ICTR and the Rwandan government may facilitate
what many believe is necessary to the ICTR's legitimacy-investigation and, if appropriate,
indictment and prosecution of persons from the largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF). 9 The RPF is the rebel movement that seized power after the massacres in Rwanda,
and remains in power as Rwanda's current government. The failure of the ICTR to indict
RPF members until now has exposed the Tribunal to criticisms of being a "victor's tribu-
nal." 0 The ICTR chief prosecutor not only intends to investigate RPF members, but also
has now publicly secured the cooperation of the Rwandan government in this endeavour.8
1. Status of Proceedings
By the end of 2000, the ICTR had forty-four individuals in custody at the ICTR
detention facility in Arusha, Tanzania. 8 The ICTR continued to receive interna-
tional cooperation in apprehending and extraditing indicted high-level political
and military leaders. In 2000, assisting countries were the United Kingdom,8' Bel-
76. See Coalition for International Justice, ICTR Judges to Visit Crime Scenes (Aug. 16, 2000), at http://
www.cij.org/content.htnl (visited Feb. 24, 2001). In response, Martin Ngoga, Rwanda's representative to the
ICTR, stated that the decision by the ICTR indicated that "many things have been put right as far as the
workings of the Tribunal and its relationship with Rwanda..." Id.
77. See Prosecutor Seeks to Move ICTR Hearings on Genocide to Rwanda, XINHuA, Nov. 21, 2000. Currently, all
trial proceedings are held at the seat of the court in Arusha, Tanzania. Ms. Del Ponte further stated that such
a move was now possible because "relations with the government has [sic] now reached a stage where proper
guarantees can be given and relied upon for the holding of ICTR trials in Rwanda itself," and that such a move
was necessary because the ICTR " must make [its] work more relevant to the people of Rwanda." Id.
78. See ICTR Press Release, ICTR Information Centre Opens in Kigali (Sept. 25, 2000), athttp://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/241.htm. The Victims Assistance Programme will provide "counseling for vic-
tims who are witnesses or potential witnesses before the tribunal." Id.
79. See Missing, THE EcoNoMIsT, Dec. 23, 2000 (U.S. Edition).
80. See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. Iocr'L
LJ. 163 (2000). Reasons cited in defense of the past policy to limit indictments to Hutus include the desirability
of "indicting and prosecuting the most serious violators first," and the desire to "maintain good relations with
the current Tutsi government in order to facilitate its investigation of international humanitarian law violations
in Rwanda." However, it has also been established that there is "overwhelming evidence to prove that Tutsis
[have] committed... serious violations of international humanitarian law" during the 1994 massacres. Id.
81. See Coalition for International Justice, Del Ponte Meets with Kagame; ICTR Investigation of RPF Addressed
(Dec. 14, 2000), at http://www.cij.org/content.htl (last visited Feb. 24, 2001).
82. See ICTR Detainees-Status on l5January 2001, at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.
htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2001).
83. ICTR Press Release, Former Rwandan Army Officer Arrested in London (Feb. 7, 2000), available at http:I/
www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/220.htn. Tharcisse Muvunyi, a former Rwandan senior army of-
ficer, was arrested in the U.K. on February 5, 2000 and transferred to the ICTR on October 30, 2000. Mr.
Muvunyi is charged with five counts including genocide and crimes against humanity (rape and other inhumane
VOL. 35, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 629
gium,s4 France, 5 Denmark,s6 and the United States. 7 Also, Swaziland became the third
country to agree to imprison persons convicted by the ICTR.ss
The trial of Georges Ruggiu, a former journalist and broadcaster, ended after the accused
changed his plea to guilty on May 15, 2000. Ruggiu was sentenced on June 1, 2000, to
twelve years in prison after being found guilty on charges of direct and public incitement
to commit genocide and crimes against humanity.8 9 The charges stemmed from media
broadcasts made by the accused during the 1994 massacres, which "encouraged setting up
of road blocks and congratulated perpetrators of massacres of the Tutsi at these road
blocks."9° Ruggiu, a native of Belgium, is the eighth person to be convicted by the ICTR
and the first non-Rwandese to be charged by the ICTR.9l
The ICTR also concluded two landmark appeals during 2000. On February 14, 2000,
the Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal of Omar Serushago, confirming the Trial Cham-
ber's sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment on charges of genocide and crimes against
humanity.92 Serushago thus became "the first person to be definitively convicted and sen-
tenced by the ICTR."93 The Appeals Chamber also unanimously upheld the conviction of
Jean Kambanda, the former prime minister of Rwanda, on October 19, 2000, for charges
acts), which stem from acts that took place in the geographical area under Mr. Muvunyi's command during
the 1994 massacres. Id.
84. See id. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the former Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie Nationale, was arrested
in Belgium on January 29, 2000, and transferred to the ICTR on April 22, 2000.
85. See ICTR Press Release, France Transfers Former Minister to Arusba (Mar. 8, 2000), available at http://
www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/223.htm. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, the former Minister for Cul-
ture and Higher Education in the interim Government of Rwanda during the 1994 massacres, is charged with,
inter alia, genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to genocide, and crimes against humanity. He
was arrested in France on November 26, 1999, and transferred to the ICTR on March 7, 2000. Id.
86. See ICTR Press Release, Captain Sagabutu Pleads Not Guilty (Nov. 28, 2000), available at http://
www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/252.htm. Captain Innocent Sagahutu was arrested in Ringkjob-
ing, Denmark, on February 15, 2000, and transferred to the ICTR detention facility on November 24, 2000.
He is charged with twelve counts including genocide, crimes against humanity, including rape, and violations
of the Geneva Conventions in his role as military commander of the Rwandan Armed Forces during the 1994
massacres of the Tutsi population and moderate Hutus. He has also been charged in connection with the killing
of former Rwandan Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian soldiers who were guarding her at the
time. Id.
87. See ICTR Press Release, Pastor Ntakirutimana Transferred to the Tribunal's Custody (Mar. 25, 2000),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIPRESSREL/2000/225.htm. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, former pas-
tor of a Seventh Day Adventist Church, is the first suspect to be arrested and extradited by the United States.
Mr. Ntakirutimana is charged under two separate indictments with, inter alia, genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and breaches of the Geneva Conventions arising from attacks against civilians, including men, women,
and children who had sought refuge in Ntakirutimana's church complex during the massacres. Ntakirutimana
was first arrested in the United States on September 29, 1996, and subsequently released. He was re-arrested
on February 26, 1998, and transferred to the ICTR detention facility on March 24, 2000. Id.
88. See ICTR Press Release, Swaziland Agrees to Enforce ICTR Sentences (Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://
www.ictr.org/ENGLISHi/PRESSREL/2000/240.htm. The other two countries that have agreed to receive
convicted individuals for imprisonment are Mali and the Republic of Benin.
89. See ICTR Press Release, Former Journalist Ruggiu Sentenced to Twelve Years in Prison (June 1, 2000),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/23 5.htm.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See ICTR Press Release, Appeals Chamber Confirms Serushago Sentence (Feb. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/22l.htm. Serushago was convicted by the Trial Chamber
on December 14, 1998.
93. Id.
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of genocide.94 Kambanda thus became "the first head of government to be convicted and
punished for genocide" by an international criminal tribunal."
2. Legal Developments
The most significant legal development at the ICTR during 2000, as in 1999, arose
through the ongoing ICTR processes against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, "a former govern-
ment official . . . [and] founder of both an extremist Hutu political party and a Rwandan
radio station that incited violence against Tutsis. ' '96 After lengthy pre-trial proceedings, the
Appeals Chamber in November 1999 dismissed the indictment against Barayagwiza and
ordered his release on the grounds that his fundamental rights had been violated by the
delays in the proceeding." However, the Appeals Chamber stayed its order to release Bar-
ayagwiza pending a motion for reconsideration by the ICTR prosecutor under Article 25
of the ICTR Statute, which provides for review of a final decision based upon new facts
"which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision."9
On March 31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber quashed its earlier ruling, having found several
"new facts." Specifically, the Appeals Chamber found that: (a) Barayagwiza was aware of
the nature of the ICTR charges against him throughout most of the relevant time period;
(b) the delay in his transfer to the ICTR was caused by government and judicial officials in
Cameroon, and not by ICTR prosecutorial negligence; and (c) Barayagwiza's attorney had
in fact agreed to a timetable which caused most of the delay between his detention in Arusha
and his initial appearance before the ICTR. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber concluded:
The new facts diminish the role played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as the intensity
of the violation of the rights of the appellant. The cumulative effect of these elements being
thus reduced, the reparation ordered by the Appeals Chamber now appears disproportionate
in relation to the events. The new facts being therefore facts which could have been decisive
in the Decision... that remedy must be modified. 9
The Chamber reinstated the charges against Barayagwiza, but decided that if found not
guilty, "he shall receive financial compensation" or, if found guilty, the "sentence shall be
reduced to take account of the violation of his rights."'00
While this decision has been saluted by many parties as the correct result, the ICTR's
legal reasoning has been criticized because it departs from Rule 120 of the Tribunal's own
Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 0' As one commentator observed, "[n]one of the 'new
94. See ICTR Press Release, Kambanda Conviction and Sentence Confirmed (Oct. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/244.htn. Kambanda had originally pled guilty and was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on September 4, 1998.
95. Id.
96. See Shenk, supra note 74, at 688.
97. See William A. Schabas, International Decision: Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 Am. J. INr'L L. 563, 565
(2000).
98. Id.
99. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration), No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, para. 71 (Mar. 31, 2000) (hereinafter "March Decision").
100. Id. at para. 75. This same remedy has been subsequently used on similar facts in Laurent Semanza v.
The Prosecutor, where Semanza also motioned for release on the grounds of illegal pre-trial detention in
Cameroon. See Press Briefing By the Spokesman for the ICTR (June 12, 2000), athttp://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/
pressbrief/briefl2600.htm.
101. Rule 120 of the ICTR's Rules of Procedure and Evidence qualifies the standard for review based on
new facts set out in Article 25 of the ICTR Statute, by requiring that the new facts be "not known to the
moving party at the time.., and not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence."
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facts'. were 'discovered,' nor were they unknown when the Appeals Chamber first heard
the case in 1999."102 Yet the Appeals Chamber itself recognized this when it stated that "[i]n
the wholly exceptional circumstances of this case, and in the face of a possible miscarriage
of justice, the Chamber construes the condition laid down in Rule 120 ... as directory in
nature." 3 As a result of this ruling, Barayagwiza's trial opened on October 23, 2000, and
is ongoing at this time."3'
HI. The Creation of New Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals and Other International Efforts to Prosecute
Violations of International Humanitarian Law
DARYL A. MUNDIS*
Significant steps were taken in 2000 to establish ad boc international criminal tribunals
to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone and Cam-
bodia. Until the International Criminal Court (ICC) is established,o 5 such efforts will con-
tinue to be necessary, since the ICC will have only prospective jurisdiction to try alleged
offenders1°6 This section describes the international efforts to create new ad boc tribunals
in Sierra Leone and Cambodia and international efforts to prosecute alleged offenders of
international humanitarian law in East Timor and Kosovo.
A. SIERRA LEONE
On August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1315, in which the
Secretary-General was requested: (I) to negotiate with the Government of Sierra Leone to
create an independent Special Court, and (2) to report on these negotiations and make
specific recommendations concerning the establishment of such a Special Court °7 Nego-
tiations were conducted in September 2000 at U.N. Headquarters and in Freetown. On
October 4, 2000, the Secretary-General forwarded his report, including the agreement with
the Government of Sierra Leone and a draft Statute for the Special Court. 08
*Daryl A. Mundis is a Legal Officer with the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and are not attributable to the United Nations, ICTY, or the Office of the
Prosecutor.
102. Schabas, supra note 97, at 568.
103. March Decision, supra note 99, at para. 65 (emphasis added).
104. See ICTR Press Release, Media Trial Opens (Oct. 23, 2000), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/
PRESSREL/2000/245.htm.
105. Pursuant to Article 126(1) of the ICC Statute (Treaty of Rome), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), the
ICC will come into existence on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit
of the 60th instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General. As of December 31, 2000, twenty-seven
States had ratified the Treaty of Rome.
106. ICC Statute Article 24(1) states: "No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for
conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute."
107. S.C. Res 1315, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
108. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (2000) ("Secretary-General's Sierra Leone Report"). This report is available on the U.N. website,
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf. The Annex to S/2000/915 contains the Agreement be-
tween the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone ("Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement") and the Enclosure contains the draft Statute for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Sierra Leone Statute").
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The Special Court will have competence to prosecute persons "who bear the most re-
sponsibility °9 for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law" committed on the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.110 Thus, unlike
the ICTY and ICTR, the Sierra Leone Special Court is a "treaty-based sui generis court of
mixed jurisdiction and composition.""' Like the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court will
have concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy over the domestic courts of Sierra Leone. " 2
The Special Court will have subject matter jurisdiction over crimes against humanity,"'
violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol
H,114 other serious violations of international humanitarian law,"' and certain enumerated
offenses under Sierra Leonean law."6 These provisions relating to crimes against humanity,
Common Article 3, and other serious violations are generally consistent with similar stat-
utory provisions for the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC.
Article 6 of the Sierra Leone Statute sets forth the provisions governing individual crim-
inal responsibility, and is consistent with similar provisions governing the ad boc Tribunals
109. The Secretary-General had proposed prosecuting those "most responsible" for the crimes committed
in Sierra Leone. The term "most responsible" was employed to denote "both a leadership or authority position
of the accused, and a sense of the gravity, seriousness or massive scale of the crime." Secretary-General's Sierra
Leone Report, supra note 108, at para. 30. As such, the term was designed not for jurisdictional purposes, but
rather as guidance for the prosecutor in designing a prosecutorial strategy. See id. However, in late December
2000, the U.N. Security Council amended the proposed Sierra Leone Statute to raise the legal standard to
those "who bear the greatest responsibility" for the offenses committed. As a result, it is expected that the
Sierra Leone Special Court will prosecute between 20 and 25 individuals. See U.N. Council Curtails Youth Trials
in Sierra Leone, N.Y. TiMES (Dec. 27, 2000).
110. Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 108, art. 1. After noting that the civil war in Sierra Leone commenced
on March 23, 1991, the Secretary-General acknowledged that "imposing a temporal jurisdiction on the Special
Court reaching back to 1991 would create a heavy burden for the prosecution and the Court." Secretary-
General's Sierra Leone Report, supra note 108, at para. 26. Several dates were considered before finally
opting for November 30, 1996, the date on which the Abidjan Peace Agreement was concluded. See id. at
paras. 2 1-28.
111. Id. at para. 9.
112. See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 108, art. 8.
113. See id. art. 2.
114. See id. art. 3.
115. See id. art. 4. Three offenses are set forth as being punishable under this article:
(a) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities;
(b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved
in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under
the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Abduction and forced recruitment of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups
for the purpose of using them to participate actively in hostilities.
116. See id. art. 5. Pursuant to this provision, the Special Court has jurisdiction over the following offences:
(a) Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926
(Cap. 31):
(i) Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6;
(ii) Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to section 7;
(iii) Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 12.
(b) Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861:
(i) Setting fire to dwelling-houses, any person being therein to section 2;
(ii) Setting fire to public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6;
(iii) Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to section 6.
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and ICC, with one important exception, Article 6(5). This provision provides that the
individual criminal responsibility provisions of Sierra Leone law govern those crimes set
forth in Article 5 of the Sierra Leone Statute. Article 10 of the Sierra Leone Statute provides
that a grant of amnesty is not a bar to prosecution by the Special Court."7
As drafted by the Secretary-General, Article 7, which governs jurisdiction over persons
as young as fifteen years of age at the time of the alleged crime, is perhaps the most con-
troversial aspect of the Sierra Leone Statute." 8 The Secretary-General had proposed ex-
tending jurisdiction over such relatively young offenders through the creation of a special
"Juvenile Chamber."" 9 This proposal drew criticism from several non-governmental or-
ganizations and human rights groups' ° and in late December 2000, the U.N. Security
Council amended the proposed Sierra Leone Statute setting legal standards that make the
prosecution of child soldiers extremely unlikely.2'
The Special Court will be composed of three organs: the trial and appellate chambers,
prosecutor, and registry.' The chambers consists of two three-judge Trial Chambers and
one five-judge Appeals Chamber.' 23 The Government of Sierra Leone will appoint one
judge for each Trial Chamber and two judges for the Appeals Chamber. The United
Nations will appoint the remaining judges.124 The accused appearing before the Special
Court is afforded all rights recognized by international human rights law.'25
117. This point is of particular significance in light of the sweeping grants of amnesty provided for in the
Lom6 Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 and the United Nations position that such amnesties may not be granted
in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law. See Secretary-General's Sierra Leone Report, supra note 108, at paras. 21-24.
118. See discussion in Secretary-General's Sierra Leone Report, supra note 108, at paras. 32-38.
119. Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 108, art. 7(3)(b). This Juvenile Chamber as envisaged would possess
wide discretion to dispose of cases, excluding imprisonment. Sierra Leone Statute Article 7(3)(0 provides: "In
the disposition of his or her case, order any of the following: care guidance and supervision orders, community
service orders, counselling, foster care, correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved
schools and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or programmes
of child protection agencies." Article 19(I) provides, in part: "The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted
person, other than a juvenile offender, imprisonment for a specified number of years."
120. For example, Human Rights Watch opposes trying offenders who were younger than 18 at the time
the offense was committed. See HRW Press Release, Sierra Leone:.Justice and the Special Court, Nov. 1, 2000,
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/11 /sl-pr-1 101 .htm. Moreover, both Human RightsWatch and Am-
nesty International have urged that the Sierra Leone Statute be amended to make the recruitment of child
soldiers younger than 15 years of age a crime. See id.; see also Amnesty International website, http://www.
amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AFR510812000?OpenDocument&of= COUNTRIES\SIERRA + LEONE.
121. U.N. Council Curtails Youth Trials in Sierra Leone, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 27, 2000. The Security Council
determined that the Special Court should have jurisdiction over adults and children who "bear the greatest
responsibility" for committing crimes. The Secretary-General had proposed trying those adults and children
who were "most responsible" for committing offenses. The U.N. Security Council recommended the estab-
lishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would "have a major role to play in the case of
juvenile offenders" and seek suitable institutions and rehabilitation for them. Id.
122. See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 108, art. 11.
123. See id. art. 12(1). Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement Article 2(3) provides that the Government of
Sierra Leone and the Secretary General shall consult on the appointment of the judges.
124. See id, art. 12(1). See also Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement, supra note 108, art. 2(a) and (b), which
provide that the Secretary-General shall appoint the judges "upon nominations forwarded by States, and in
particular the member States of the Economic Community of West African States and the Commonwealth, at
the invitation of the Secretary General."
125. See id. art. 17. For example, the accused is entitled to a fair and public hearing (subject to measures
ordered for the protection of victims and witnesses, as is the case for the ad boc Tribunals), to the presumption
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Regarding the Rules of Evidence and Procedure (RPE), the Sierra Leone Statute dictates
that the ICTR's RPE in force at the time of the establishment of the Special Court will
apply.126 In the event that the ICTR's RPE do not adequately address a specific situation
arising in the context of the Special Court, the judges are empowered to amend the RPE,
in which event they are to rely on the 1965 Sierra Leonean Criminal Procedure Act for
guidance.'27
Upon conviction, the Special Court may impose imprisonment' and the "forfeiture of
the property, proceeds and any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct." 29 In
determining an appropriate sentence, the Special Court is to have recourse to the sentencing
practices of the ICTR and the Sierra Leone domestic courts. 30
The seat of the Special Court will be in Sierra Leone and the official language will be
English. The U.N. Security Council has proposed that the Special Court be financed
through voluntary contributions and not through an assessment on all U.N. members, as
proposed by the Secretary-General."' The Special Court will come into operation on the
day after both the United Nations and Sierra Leone have notified each other that the legal
instruments for entry into force have been complied with.132 Neither party had adopted the
Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement by December 31, 2000.
B. CAMBODIA
In 1999, a bill was introduced in the Cambodian National Assembly to establish a Cam-
bodian tribunal,"' with the participation of international judges and prosecutors, to pros-
ecute senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge for their alleged criminal activities during the
reign of terror that consumed Cambodia during the period from April 17, 1975 to January
6, 1979."3
Discussions between the Secretary-General and the Cambodian Prime Minister resolved
the outstanding substantive issues concerning the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,"' although the
proposed statute for this tribunal has not been made public yet. Negotiations between the
Cambodian and United Nations officials on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
that will govern technical issues regarding the establishment of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
of innocence, to assert the right against self-incrimination; to have counsel; and to be present throughout the
proceedings.
126. See id. art. 14(1).
127. See id. art. 14(2).
128. See id. art. 19(1).
129. Id. art. 19(3). This article provides that forfeited property, proceeds or assets are to be returned to their
rightful owner or the Sierra Leone Government.
130. See id. art. 19(1).
131. U.N. Council Curtails Youth Trials in Sierra Leone, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 27 2000.
132. Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement, supra note 108, art. 20.
133. See David Stoelting, Enforcement of International Criminal Law, 34 IT'L LAw. 669, 669-70 (2000).
134. International efforts to establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal intensified following the release of the report
of the expert group appointed by the Secretary-General to examine the Cambodian Government request for
international assistance in bringing the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice. See U.N. Doc. A/53/850-
S/1999/2 31 (Mar. 16, 1999); Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 948, 948-953 (1999).
135. See United Nations Press Release, United Nations Legal Counsel Completes Discussions with Cambodian
Government on the Fstablishment of Tribunal to Try Khmer Rouge Leaders (July 6, 2000), available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000706.sgsm748.doc.htnl.
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were completed on July 6, 2000.136 The MOU is to be signed once the Cambodian National
Assembly enacts the necessary legislation to establish the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The
debate on this legislation was scheduled to begin during the last week in December 2000.
The draft statute and MOU were leaked to the press in October 2000,31 and although
not necessarily the final versions of these documents, they do provide a rough outline
of the proposed tribunal. For example, unlike the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal will be comprised of a three-tiered structure, 3 ' consisting of one trial
court,1' 9 an appeals court,'- and a supreme court.'14 The Draft statute also provides for Co-
Investigating Judges to conduct the investigations and Co-Prosecutors to prepare indict-
ments against suspects.
42
The Khmer Rouge Tribunal will have subject matter jurisdiction over six categories of
offenses: (1) crimes set forth in the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia;14 (2) genocide;' 44
(3) crimes against humanity; 4 1 (4) grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions; '
(5) destruction of cultural property in violation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; 147 and (6) offenses committed
against internationally protected persons as set forth in the 1973 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents.1
48
Article 29 of the Draft Khmer Rouge Statute sets forth the provisions concerning indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, and is consistent with international criminal law norms. Ar-




137. These leaked documents were published in the PHNOM PENH Posr, Volume 9, Issue 22, Oct. 27-
Nov. 9, 2000. The following citations to the Draft Khmer Rouge Statute and Draft MOU are taken from the
version as published in this newspaper.
138. Draft Khmer Rouge Statute, supra note 137, art. 2.
139. Consisting of three Cambodian judges and two international judges. Draft MOU, supra note 137, art.
2; Draft Khmer Rouge Statute, supra note 137, art. 9.
140. Consisting of four Cambodian judges and three international judges. Id.
141. Consisting of five Cambodian judges and four international judges. Id.
142. There will be one Cambodian Investigating Judge and one international Investigating Judge. Draft
Khmer Rouge Statute, supra note 137, art. 231; Draft MOU, supra note 137, art. 4. One prosecutor will be
Cambodian, the other a foreign national. Draft Khmer Rouge Statute art. 16 and Draft MOU art. 5. In the
event of disagreements between either the Co-Investigating Judges or the Co-Prosecutors, a detailed scheme
for resolving such differences is envisioned. See Draft Khmer Rouge Statute arts. 20 and 23, and Draft MOU
art. 6.
143. Draft Khmer Rouge Statute, supra note 137, art. 3.
144. See id. art. 4.
145. See id. art. 5.
146. See id. art. 6.
147. See id. art. 7.
148. See id. art. 8.
149. Concerning the right to counsel there have been reports that the Cambodian Legislative Commission,
which is responsible for directing the bill through the parliamentary process, has added a provision barring
foreign attorneys from appearing before the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Under this amendment, foreign counsel
would be permitted to advise Cambodian defense counsel, but would be prohibited from addressing the court.
See http:/Aistserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2 = ind0012&L = justwatch-1 &D = 1 &O = D&F = &S = &P =
43228 (last visited July 24, 2001).
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The Khmer Rouge Tribunal is to be located in Phnom Penh'55 and the official working
language shall be Khmer, with translations into English and French."' Salaries and expenses
of the Tribunal shall be borne by both Cambodia and the United Nations in accord with
a schedule set forth in Article 44 of the Draft Khmer Rouge Statute and Articles 14 and 15
of the Draft MOU.
As noted by the negotiators of the MOU upon completion of their discussions in July
2000, the responsibility for establishing the Khmer Rouge Tribunal now rests with the
Cambodian Government and its legislative process.'
C. EAST TIMOR
On October 25, 1999, the United Nations assumed responsibility for the administration
of East Timor following the collapse of the rule of law during late summer 1999.111 As part
of this administration, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including
the administration of justice. Thus, the United Nations is effectively running the court
system in the former Indonesian territory.
On December 11, 2000, United Nations prosecutors issued the first indictments against
eleven individuals, including one Indonesian Army officer, for crimes against humanity,
including forced deportations of thousands of civilians and the murder of three priests and
two nuns.5 4 Prosecutors expect to issue additional indictments in early 2001.
D. Kosovo
Although the ICTY has jurisdiction over violations committed in Kosovo during the
armed conflict that occurred in that province in 1999, the U.N. Administrator for Kosovo
proposed on June 22, 2000 a quasi-international court to prosecute alleged offenders for
war crimes committed in Kosovo.' In the Secretary-General's Report on the financing of
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for the period
from July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001, 121 specific positions were requested to launch
the Special Programme of International Judicial Support in Kosovo.1 6 As part of this ini-
tiative, the Secretary-General has requested budgetary authority for eleven international
judges, three international prosecutors, and additional legal, linguistic, secretarial and other
support. At the close of 2000, eight international judges and three international prosecutors
were working in the local courts.
150. See Draft Khmer Rouge Statute, supra note 137, art. 43.
151. See id. art. 45.
152. See United Nations Press Release, supra note 135.
153. See U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 4057th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
154. United Nations Issues Indictments for East Timor Crimes, Isrr'L HERALD TRiB., Dec. 12, 2000.
155. Carlotta Gall, U.N. Mission in Kosovo Proposes to Set Up a War Crimes Court, N.Y. TiMES, June 23, 2000,
at A3.
156. Financing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 133, at 5-7, U.N. Doc. A/55/624 (2000), available at http://www.org/ga/55/lista55d.htm.
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IV. Crime Control Treaties
MAvls M. GYAMFI*
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONVENTION
After two years of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime, "7 the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Crime Convention)
at its Millennium Assembly on November 15, 2000.Ii s Although the Ad Hoc Committee
began its work two years ago, the Crime Convention originated six years earlier, when the
U.N. adopted the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organized
Transnational Crime.5 9 The Naples Declaration requested that the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice initiate the process of obtaining States' positions on a
convention against organized transnational crime. The adoption and signing of the Crime
Convention was a major forward step in the fight against organized crime.
There are two protocols to the Crime Convention: the Protocol against the Smuggling
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.160 These were adopted by the General
Assembly together with the Crime Convention. A third protocol, the Protocol against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, is still under negotiation. The Ad Hoc Committee included in the draft
resolution two paragraphs in which the General Assembly would note that the Ad Hoc
Committee had not completed its work on the draft protocol on firearms and would request
it to finalize such work as soon as possible. Several governments emphasized the importance
of the finalization of the draft protocol prior to the Conference on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, which will be held in New York July 9-20, 2001.161
The Crime Convention is the first multilateral treaty in the field of organized crime. Its
stated purpose is "to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized
crime more effectively." 12 Under the Crime Convention, State Parties that have not already
done so must establish the following four criminal offenses in their domestic law:
*Mavis M. Gyamfi is an associate in the Business and Finance Practice Group, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, New York, NY.
157. The General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on December 9, 1998 in Resolution 53/
111. The Ad Hoc Committee was composed of over 120 U.N. Member States.
158. The General Assembly adopted the Crime Convention without a vote through a resolution. United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res 55/2 5, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 105, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2000), available at http://www.undcp.org/crimecicp-
resolutions.html.
159. U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 94th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/159 (1994), available at http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r159/htm.
160. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
was based on a draft submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by the delegations of the United States and Argentina.
161. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm., 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.254/38 (2001), available at http://www.
odccp.org/adhoc/crime/session 12/crime-cicp.convention session_12.html. The Ad Hoc Committee left it to
the General Assembly to decide whether to set a more specific deadline in the resolution. The General Assembly
decided to keep the "as soon as possible" language. See G.A. Res. 55/25, supra note 158.
162. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex 1,
Agenda Item 105, U.N. Doc. A/55/303 (2000) [hereinafter Crime Convention].
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1. Participation in an organized criminal group;
2. Money laundering;
3. Corruption; and
4. Obstruction of justice.161
Parties to the treaty must also provide technical assistance to developing countries to help
them take the necessary measures to implement and enforce the Crime Convention and
otherwise fight organized crime.164
Extradition is important to the effectiveness of the Crime Convention. The crimes cov-
ered by the Crime Convention are to be made extraditable by State Parties. 165 A party that
makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty may use the Crime Convention
as the legal basis for extradition if it receives an extradition request based on an offense
covered by the Crime Convention from a country with whom it does not have an existing
treaty.
166
The Crime Convention and its two protocols were opened for signature at The High-
Level Political Signing Conference held from December 12-15, 2000, in Palermo, Italy-
a country whose struggle with organized crime is well known. The conference was hosted
by the Italian government and the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention. At the signing conference, 124 of the 189 Member States of the United
Nations, including the United States, signed the Crime Convention. The Crime Conven-
tion will enter into force after forty countries ratify it.
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampani were
among persons speaking at the signing. Several praised the Crime Convention as a positive
step in battling organized crime. Others were less certain of its effectiveness. Spain's Min-
ister of the Interior, Jaime Mayor Oreja, stated: "Yet loopholes for escaping the law are
amazing and include recourse to political explanation and protection."'6 7 Turkey's repre-
sentative expressed concern that the Crime Convention does not explicitly mention terrorist
groups as organized criminal groups, stating that "It must be ensured that anyone com-
mitting a criminal act covered by the Convention and its protocols would not be immune
from justice by claiming political motives. ' ' 16s Despite these concerns, both Spain and Tur-
key signed the Crime Conventions and the two protocols thereto.
Frank Loy, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, proclaimed that the
United States has been at the forefront of the fight against international organized crime. 169
He further emphasized that the United States has established International Law Enforce-
ment Academies in Budapest and Bangkok where local law enforcement personnel learn
about organized crime and that the United States will open two more in Africa and Latin
America in the near future. 175 The United States signed the Crime Convention and both
of its protocols.
163. Id. arts. 5, 6, 8, 23.
164. See id. art. 30.
165. See id. art. 16.
166. See id. at j4.
167. U.N. Press Release, Palermo Convention's High-Level Political Signing Conference Continues HearingState-
ments on Combating Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. LF//43 52 (2000).
168. Id.
169. See U.S. Dept. of State, Frank E. Loy Statement to United Nations Convention Against Organized
Crime High-Level Political Signing Conference (Dec. 13, 2000), at http://www.state.gov/www/policy-
remarks/2000/001213_loy-crime.html.
170. See id.
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State Parties to the Crime Convention committed not only to establish corruption as a
criminal offense in their domestic legislation, but also to "adopt legislative, administrative
or other effective measures to promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish the
corruption of public officials."' In April 2000, the U.N. Crime Commission decided to
recommend to the General Assembly that a comprehensive global anti-corruption conven-
tion be developed following the completion of the Crime Convention.
B. OECD CovrNoN
The year 2000 saw progress for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (OECD Convention). Ten countries'72 ratified it in 2000, bringing
the total number of ratifying countries to twenty-six. 7 ' The OECD Convention entered
into force on February 15, 1999.
U.S. Department of State Deputy Spokesman, Philip T Reeker, stated that the OECD
Convention "represents a key element in the [Clinton] Administration's wider anti-
corruption strategy .... ,14 The United States presented its first report to the OECD on
its implementation of the OECD Convention this past year. The OECD's Working Group
commended the United States for its substantial contribution to the fight against corrup-
tion, but also noted problems with U.S. anti-corruption law, such as the discrepancy be-
tween the fifteen-year maximum sentence for bribery of domestic public officials and the
five-year sentence for bribery of foreign public officials.' The report was one of many
opportunities the United States took to highlight the fight against corruption during the
year.176 The United States also released "Battling International Bribery 2000" in June of
2000, the second of six annual reports to Congress reviewing the implementation and en-
forcement of the OECD Convention, and discussing other countries' implementation of
the OECD Convention.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES
This section summarizes domestic measures to advance crime control treaty obligations
and goals.
171. Crime Convention, supra note 162, art. 9, 1.
172. The countries are: Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzer-
land, and Turkey. Brazil, Poland and Turkey have not yet adopted implementing legislation. OECD Online,
STEPS TAKEN AND PLANNED FUTURE ACTIONS BY EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY TO RATIFY AND IMPLEMENT
THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS (2001) [hereinafter STEPS TAKEN].
173. Id. Though 26 countries have ratified the Bribery Convention, 34 countries have signed it.
174. U.S. Dept. of State, Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Battling International Bribery 2000, at
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/psOO0629.htmlune 29, 2000).
175. OECD ONLINE, UNITED STATES REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 REc-
OMMENDATION, http://www.oecd.org.
176. Id. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urged signatory governments to enact strong imple-
menting legislation that fully meets the requirements of the OECD Convention at the 2000 World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In February 2000, Former Under Secretary of State Alan Larson marked the
first anniversary of the OECD Convention's entry into force by holding a press conference at which he reviewed
progress on implementing the anti-bribery agreement and pushed for all signatories to bring it into effect.
Former Under Secretary Larson also raised the OECD Convention during preparations for the G-8 Summit
in Japan. See U.S. Dept. of State, Battling International Bribery 2000, at http://www.state.gov/www/issues/
economic/bribery_2000_rpt.pdf(une 29, 2000) [hereinafter Battling International Bribery].
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Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Parliament adopted amendments to its domestic law relating
to the criminalization of "offering" and "promising" of a bribe as well as the abolition of
the concept of provocation as a defense onJune 8, 2000. In May 2000, a draft supplementing
the Law on Administrative Offenses and Sanctions was submitted to Parliament for its
approval. The draft would allow the imposition of monetary sanctions and forfeiture on
legal persons that are convicted of bribery.'77
Czech Republic. In addition to ratifying the OECD Convention last year, the Czech
Republic also ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption on
September 8, 2000.178
Iceland. The Icelandic Parliament amended its General Penal Code to remove limits on
the level of fines for legal persons, and to increase the statute of limitations on bribery to
five years.7 9
Japan. In April 2000,Japan adopted a new policy excluding companies involved in bribery
from official development assistance contracts. °80
Nigeria. The Nigerian government in collaboration with the U.N. Office for Drug
Control and Crime Prevention organized a conference entitled "Corruption and Organized
Crime: Challenges for the New Millennium." The conference was held in Abuja, Nigeria
from May 7-11, 2000. The topics included "Combating Organized Crime through Inter-
national Cooperation" and "Corruption: A Threat to Democracy and Development.,,1sl
South Korea. In February 2000, President Kim Dae Jung launched an anti-corruption
website, named "Shinmungo,"on which Korean citizens could report complaints about un-
fair treatment and public corruption. 2
Sweden. In February 2000, Sweden's Minister for Trade, Leif Pagrotsky, co-hosted and
addressed a colloquium on corruption in the arms trade. Minister Pagrotsky called for a
sustained and purposeful effort to address the problem.'s
United States. The United States ratified other international anti-corruption conven-
tions in the year 2000: (1) the Inter-American Convention on Corruption on September
29, 2000, and (2) the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (COE
Convention) on October 11, 2000. The United States also plans to join the Group of States
Against Corruption (GRECO). The GRECO is a mechanism for monitoring the imple-
mentation of the COE Convention and other COE anti-corruption obligations. Twenty-
four countries have joined thus far, and the GRECO has begun operating.
D. CONCLUSION
The year 2000 saw significant progress in the areas of transnational organized crime and
corruption. It is a positive sign that the Crime Convention and its protocols were met with
such overwhelming support by the U.N. Member States. It is important, however, to moni-




181. United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Corruption and Organized Crime:
Challenges for the New Millennium (2000).
182. See Battling International Bribery, supra note 176, at 53.
183. See id. at 54.
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tor how countries that ratified the various conventions described above will implement and
enforce them domestically.
V. Justice for Haiti: The Raboteau Trial
BRIAN CONCANNON, JR.*
Haiti's Raboteau Massacre trial was a major, though under-reported, development in
international law in 2000. The case is a milestone in the international fight against impunity
for large-scale human rights violations. It can also serve as a model for other countries
attempting to address the crimes of a dictatorship through national prosecutions after a
democratic transition.
The trial concluded on November 9, 2000 when, after six weeks of trial and five years
of pre-trial proceedings, a jury in the Haitian city of Gonaifves convicted sixteen former
soldiers and paramilitaries for participating in the April 1994 Raboteau Massacre. A week
later, the judge convicted thirty-seven more defendants in absentia, including the entire
military high command and the heads of the paramilitary FRAPH (Front R~volutionnaire
pour l'Avancement et le Progr~s Haitiens).
The Raboteau case marked a sharp break with a long tradition of impunity in Haiti. The
case was the most complex in the country's history, and was the first broad prosecution of
commanders for human rights violations. Most important, the proceedings were fair to
victims and defendants alike, as attested by national and international monitors. Raboteau's
success was due in large part to the persistence of individuals, especially the victims, but
also reflected significant systemic improvements in Haiti's judiciary since its democratic
transition began in 1994.
A. BACKGROUND
Haiti's justice system, never a model of fairness, was ravaged by the thirty-year dictator-
ship of Frangois andJean-Claude Duvalier (1957-1986), and again during the brutal defacto
regime. The defactos murdered and tortured with impunity for three years, 84 and attacked
judicial authorities that tried to curb their abuses.' 5 When the constitutional authorities
returned in October 1994, they inherited a justice system with no capacity for, tradition of,
or interest in, handling either complex cases or prosecutions of those who had wielded
power. 186
*Brian Concannon, Jr. has worked in Haiti for the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux for five years.
184. See generally Si M Pa Rele, Rapport de la Commission Nationale de Veriti et de Justice (1997) [hereinafter
Truth and Justice Commission Report]; Irwin Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti (1997); Human Rights Watch/
Americas, Terror Prevails in Haiti: Human Rights and Failed Diplomacy, at 5-7 (1994).
185. A former prosecutor testified in the Raboteau trial, and was asked why he did not initiate any prose-
cution after the massacre. He acknowledged that he had a legal obligation to do so, but invoked the Creole
proverb: "Konstitisyon se papye, bayonet sefe" (the Constitution is paper, bayonets are steel).
186. For a more in-depth treatment of the obstacles to justice in Haiti's democratic transition, see Brian
Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Prosecutions, a View from
Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 201 (2000). See also WILLIAM G. O'NEILL & ELLIOT SCHRAGE, PAPER LAws,
STEEL BAYONETS: BREA OwN OF THE RULE OF LAW IN HAITI 1 (1990) ("There is no system of justice in Haiti.
Even to speak of a 'Haitian Justice System' dignifies the brutal use of force by officers and soldiers, the chaos
of Haitian courtrooms and prisons, and the corruption ofjudges and prosecutors"); STOTZKY, supra note 184,
at 81 (Haiti's judicial structure is "less developed than that of virtually any nation that has attempted" a
democratic transition).
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Raboteau is a poor neighborhood of fishermen, salt rakers, and small merchants. When
the neighborhood sparked the nationwide protests in 1985 that led to the departure of
Jean-Claude "Baby-Doc" Duvalier, it acquired a reputation for resisting tyranny. When the
army ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first democratically elected president, on Sep-
tember 30, 1991, the people of Raboteau immediately took to the streets, joining tens of
thousands of democrats around the country. In Raboteau, as elsewhere, the soldiers shot
into the crowds, killing unarmed demonstrators.
Over the next two and a half years, the people of Raboteau continued their nonviolent
resistance. They held clandestine meetings, hid refugees, circulated literature, and orga-
nized demonstrations. Is7 The dictatorship responded by sending military and paramilitary
patrols into the area; beating, threatening, arresting, and torturing those involved in the
resistance, as well as anyone believed to be connected with them. Houses were sacked,
money stolen, and businesses destroyed.
B. THE MAsSACRE
The repression in Raboteau culminated in the events of April 18-22, 1994. Throughout
1994, the international community had increased the pressure on the dictatorship, and the
regime had responded by increasing its pressure on the Haitian people. On April 18, the
army and paramilitaries conducted what has been called "the rehearsal" in Raboteau. Charg-
ing into Raboteau in pickup trucks, they shot at and chased the young men who formed
the backbone of the resistance.
They watched as the activists fled to the harbor, Raboteau's "embassy," where those
fleeing the army could find safety under the water or in a local fishing boat. The attackers
also sacked the house of a prominent local leader, and savagely beat an elderly blind man,
who died the next day. Over the next few days, the army planned and organized. Reinforce-
ments arrived, and the barracks were placed on "Condition D," full alert.
The main attack started before dawn on April 22. Army troops and paramilitaries ap-
proached Raboteau from several angles, and started shooting. They charged into houses,
breaking down doors, stealing and destroying possessions. They terrorized the occupants.
Young and old, men, women, and children were threatened, beaten, forced to lie in open
sewers, and arrested. The onslaught forced many to take the familiar route to the harbor,
but this time an armed ambush awaited them. Many were killed; some were wounded, on
the beach, in the water and in boats. Some were arrested, imprisoned, and tortured. One
girl shot in the leg had to flee the hospital the next day, and another hospital a few days
later when soldiers came looking for her.
The death total will never be known, because the attackers prevented relatives from
claiming the bodies. Several were buried by paramilitaries in shallow graves and disinterred
by animals and eaten. Others floated out to sea. The prosecution felt that eight murders
were sufficiently documented to present to the jury. Dozens were assaulted, arrested, im-
prisoned, and/or tortured. Thousands fled their homes, as the bustling neighborhood
cleared out.
187. The information in this section came mostly from trial testimony and the author's interviews with
victims (1995-2000). See also TRUTH AND JUSTICE CommissoN REPORT, supra note 184, at 66 (report devoted
a special section to Raboteau).
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C. THE FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
For the victims, trial preparation started the day after the massacre. The local justice of
the peace lived in Raboteau, and he toured the neighborhood, documenting the damage to
houses and taking witness statements as people returned. A French priest with the Catholic
Church's Justice and Peace Commission helped preserve medical records and more state-
ments. When the elected government returned to power five months later, the victims
began the long fight to force their case through the justice system. Although the case
enjoyed broad popular and deep governmental support, the prosecution often seemed
bogged down, and in the end took five years to reach trial.
The victims collaborated enthusiastically with government initiatives, especially the
Truth and Justice Commission, which devoted a chapter of its report to the massacre.' s
The victims also aggressively lobbied local, national, and international media and human
rights groups, and pressured government officials. They employed an array of tactics: dem-
onstrations, press conferences, and faxes, forging links with other groups, even creating
their own songs. Eventually the Raboteau massacre became the leading symbol for the
dictatorship's repression, and its prosecution a key indicator of Haiti's progress in reforming
its justice system.
The Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), a group of lawyers funded by the Haitian
government, started working on the Raboteau case in 1996. The BAI prepared complaints
for the victims, represented them in court proceedings, and helped them advocate outside
of the courtroom. The cornerstone of the BAI's strategy was the "partie-civile" process,
which, under the French system adopted by Haiti, allows the victims' claims for money
damages against the defendants to piggyback on the criminal prosecution. Partie-civile law-
yers can participate in almost all phases of the criminal case, especially the trial. In addition
to the victims, the BAI worked closely with prosecutors, the investigating magistrates, po-
lice, and national officials.
The Haitian government also established a special coordination office that handled lo-
gistics and coordinated the activities of the various actors. The office organized seminars
for the victims and arranged for medical, psychological, and economic assistance. A special
unit of the newly formed Haitian police pursued and arrested many of the suspects. After
one defendant escaped in 1996, Gonaives' prison officials were replaced, and the building
was reinforced.
In addition to efforts specific to the case, the preparation for the Raboteau massacre trial
reflected broader improvements in Haiti's justice system since 1994. The area where im-
provement was most needed, and most made, was in the individual capacity of judicial
personnel. Both the trial judge and the chief prosecutor were justices of the peace at the
time of the transition, but had moved quickly up the ranks due to training and continuing
education programs. The judge graduated at the top of the first class of Haiti's new Ecole
de la Magisqrature, a training academy for judges and prosecutors. An assistant prosecutor
had recently returned from a year at France's Ecole de la Magistrature. He was the academic
director of Haiti's Ecole at the time of trial, and after his performance in the Raboteau case
he was named chief prosecutor in Port-au-Prince.
188. TRTrrH AND JUSTICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 184, at 66. The government also sponsored a
"Complaint Bureau (Bureau de Doliances)" to collect testimony for prosecutors. Although the prosecutors lacked
the capacity to pursue the cases, the Bureau's preservation of evidence helped identify and evaluate witnesses.
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The Haitian justice system was also able to respect all of the relevant procedures by the
time of trial. In 1996, the constitutional requirement that warrants be written in French
and Haitian Creole was rarely observed, because the forms were only in French. Defendants
did not obtain counsel until just before trial, which prevented adequate trial preparation
and appeal of pre-trial rulings. The jury was chosen from a small pool of the local elite. In
the Raboteau case, defendants were all held pursuant to valid, bilingual warrants. They
were represented from the beginning by some of Haiti's best criminal lawyers, who ag-
gressively fought pre-trial rulings all the way to the Supreme Court.1 9 The jury was chosen
from a wide geographic, economic, and social spectrum.
Material improvements were made as well. The Canadian government replaced all of
Haiti's provincial trial court buildings (the old Gonaives courthouse had no electricity,
telephone, or toilet. During slow trials one could observe the appeals court through the
floorboards). In 1997, several hearings were delayed because prison authorities did not have
a vehicle to transport a prisoner to court. By 2000, the prison system was able transport all
twenty-two defendants in custody at once, with no hitches.
The Raboteau prosecution was spared two common obstacles to transitional justice, an
army and an amnesty law. The army was disbanded in 1995, and the amnesty law, enacted
under international pressure, was intentionally toothless. 90 In addition, there was broad
popular support for the trial, and little open resistance. As a result, most of the struggle to
get the case to trial was against the justice system itself.
D. THE TRIAL
The Raboteau massacre trial was the largest and most complicated in Haiti's history. The
entire six weeks'l9 were broadcast live on national radio, much of it on TV, and were the
main topic of conversation everywhere. It was the first time the military leadership had
been tried for human rights violations. The prosecution used an unprecedented number of
witnesses and documents, and pioneered the use of expert testimony in criminal cases.
Each day of the trial was observed by several Haitian human rights organizations, as well
as by members of MICAH, the United Nations Support Mission to Haiti. The prosecution
team's four lawyers worked closely with two lawyers from the BAI, who represented the
civil interests of the victims.'92 A total often lawyers represented the twenty-two defendants
in custody.'93
The core of the prosecution's case was eyewitness testimony. Thirty-four witnesses tes-
tified for the prosecution, including victims, their neighbors, and local officials. The eye-
189. David Stoelting, Enforcement of International Criminal Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 669, 671 (2000).
190. The amnesty only applied to the act of staging the coup d'6tat, not the consequent brutality. It has
never been invoked by a defendant in a coup-era human rights trial. Concannon, supra note 186, at n.54.
191. Trials in Haiti, once started, usually go until they end, with brief recesses for food and rest, but not
for sleep. This often means they stretch into the morning of the next day. The first recent trial to abandon
this practice was the Carrefour Feuilles Massacre trial, held in August 2000. That trial, of several policemen,
some high ranking, for the killing of eleven civilians in 1999, was considered Haiti's best ever before Raboteau.
Like the Carrefour Feuilles trial, the Raboteau trial started each morning, and recessed each afternoon or early
evening.
192. BAI lawyers, as parties civiles, presented evidence, questioned witnesses, made legal arguments and gave
a closing statement.
193. In absentia defendants are not allowed legal representation, as they have not accepted the jurisdiction
of the court. They are allowed to send a friend or relative to explain their absence to the court.
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witness accounts were highly consistent and were corroborated by expert testimony. With
a few minor exceptions, the witnesses' stories withstood rigorous scrutiny.194
An international team of forensic anthropologists had exhumed and studied the remains
of three presumed victims in 1995, and interviewed survivors. A team member testified to
how its observations: injured bones, clothing, ropes around the skeletons' necks, even a key
to the house where the victim had reportedly stayed, confirmed the witness' accounts. A
geneticist established that DNA from two of the bodies matched that of the reported vic-
tims' relatives.
The case against the military and paramilitary leadership, who were tried in absentia, was
based on command responsibility and accomplice theories. The former head of MIC1VIH,
the U.N./O.A.S. human rights mission to Haiti explained how the repression was organized
systematically and on a national scale, and included military and paramilitary elements. He
noted that Gonaives, and particularly Raboteau, had been targeted throughout the coup
years, and that the leadership was well aware of this repression. He concluded that the
attack had been planned and covered up by national military and civilian leaders.
Two Argentine military experts had investigated the Raboteau massacre at the court's
request in 1999. Their report' 95 concluded that the military leaders were responsible for
the massacre under both Haitian and international law. At trial, they explained the legal
responsibility of the soldiers, both superiors and subordinates. The experts opined that the
high command was at least aware of the massacre beforehand, and did nothing to stop it.
They also described the army as "a criminal enterprise" that was organized for repressing
civilians, rather than for any legitimate military purpose.
The documentary evidence included information from the army archives, and reports
from human rights organizations. The army documents were particularly useful in describ-
ing how the military units were organized, and supplied by the high command. Individual
soldiers' personnel files disproved their defenses that they were at another barracks at the
time of the massacre. The prosecution even obtained the high command's report on the
incident, which demonstrated its knowledge of the massacre and failure to punish those
involved.
Many documents did not make it into the courtroom. Approximately 160,000 pages were
removed from Haitian military and paramilitary offices by U.S. troops in 1994. Despite
repeated calls for their return by the Haitian government, members of the U.S. Congress,
the United Nations, human rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Inter-
national, and a host of organizations and individuals in more than thirty countries, the
documents had not been returned.
The defendants erected a common front. All but one claimed that they were not present
at the massacre, and most claimed to have little knowledge of it until their arrests. With
slight exceptions, none inculpated a co-defendant. The official military version of the in-
194. In the Haitian system, the judge starts each witness by asking a broad, open-ended question about the
event. The judge asks follow-up questions then defers to the prosecutor (for either defense or prosecution
witnesses). When the prosecutor is finished, the jury members are invited to ask questions. After that, the
lawyers for the victims and for the defendants each take their turn, but are not allowed to address the witness
directly. They must propose a question to the judge, who may pose it as is, modify it or reject it altogether.
195. Horacio Pantaleon Ballester & Jose Luis Garcia, Responsabilitis hirarcbiques des Frces Armies d'Hafti
dans k ddroulement des opirations survenues du 18 au 22 avril 1994 h Raboteau (Gonai'es), (1999) (report to court
on file with author).
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cident, expressed in press releases and by the highest-ranking defendant at trial (a captain),
was that there was no massacre; that the army had responded to an attack on a military post
by chasing some of the "terrorists" away, without significant casualties on either side.196
The jury deliberated for four hours, and found sixteen of the twenty-two defendants in
custody guilty, all of serious crimes. Twelve of these were convicted for premeditated mur-
der and received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. The other four received
sentences from four to nine years. The in absentia defendants all received the mandatory
life imprisonment, but they are entitled to a new trial if they return to Haiti. In the civil
portion of the case, the victims were awarded a total of U.S.$140 million in damages.
National and international observers agreed that the trial was fair to victims and accused
alike. Adama Dieng, the U.N. Human Rights Commission Independent Expert on Haiti,
called the trial "a huge step forward" for the Haitian justice system. 97 The U.N.'s MICAH
added that the Raboteau massacre case, along with the August 2000 Carrefour Feuilles
massacre trial, "prove that the Haitian Justice system is capable of effectively prosecuting"
human rights cases, "while respecting the guarantees of the 1987 Constitution and Inter-
national Treaties to which Haiti is a party."' 98 Lovinsky Pierre-Antoine of Fondation 30
Septembre, Haiti's largest victims' group, called the trial "fair and balanced for victims and
accused alike" and hoped it would be a model for future cases.
E. FOLLOW-UP
Despite this success, the Raboteau massacre case is not finished. Adama Dieng empha-
sized that the "Haitian justice system must continue to pursue those convicted in absentia,"
and called on "[c]ountries where the fugitives may be found" to cooperate with Haitian
authorities to arrest and extradite them. 199 Raoul Cedras, the army Commander-in-Chief,
and Philippe Biamby, head of the High Command, are in Panama, while Michel Francois,
the third leader of the coup, is in Honduras. The rest of the High Command, as well as
Emmanuel Constant, the leader of the paramilitary FRAPH organization, are reported to
be in the United States.
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196. The U.S. Embassy military attach6 visited the area of the alleged attack a few days later, as did a team
from MICIVIH. Both found no sign of an attack on the post. There were no reports of any military or
paramilitary injuries.
197. U.N. Press Release, Raboteau Verdict in Haiti A Landmark in Fight Against Impunity; But Case Not Yet
Finished, Says UN Independent Expert (Nov. 20, 2000), available at http://www.unog.ch/news2/
documents/newsen/hrOO090e.html [hereinafter Raboteau Verdict].
198. Press Release, United Nations Support Mission to Haiti (MICAH) (Nov. 20, 2000) (author's translation)
(on file with author).
199. Raboteau Verdict, supra note 197.
200. Concannon, supra note 186, at n. 11, 12 and accompanying text. Constant was ordered deported from
the United States to Haiti in September 1995, on the grounds that his presence in the United States was
inimical to U.S. policy, as it gave the impression that the government condoned his death squad activities. In
re Emmanuel Constant, No. A 74 002 009 (Immigration Ct. 1995). Shortly thereafter, Constant stated in a
"60 Minutes" interview that he had coordinated his activities with the CIA, who paid and encouraged him.
The deportation order was never executed. See also David Grann, Giving "The Devil" His Due, THE ATLANTIc
MONTHLY, June 2001, at 54 (extensive article on Constant, his activities during the dictatorship, and his rela-
tionship with U.S. intelligence services). Colonel Carl Dorelien, a high command member convicted in the
Raboteau trial was arrested by the INS and ordered deported by an immigration judge on June 21 2001. See
Jody Benjamin, Haitian Enforcer Bids to Stay Put, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, June 22, 2001.
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The BAI, along with clinical programs at DePaul University's International Human
Rights Law Institute and Yale's Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human
Rights, is preparing extradition requests for defendants living in the United States. The
BAI is also pursuing the civil damages.
The Raboteau massacre case has changed the way that Haitians perceive their justice
system. For the first time, the system has been used by those traditionally without power
to vindicate their rights against the traditionally powerful. For the first time, human rights
victims, judges, and prosecutors throughout the country believe that the justice system really
can and should provide justice. This has created a constituency for the system in general,
and human rights cases in particular, both within and without the system. Victims who had
previously been wary of formal justice now articulate exactly how they want their trial to
be, with the Raboteau trial as the standard. Judges and prosecutors who had been wary of
prominent cases now see them as realistic opportunities to do good and establish their
reputation. For this reason, the Raboteau massacre case will not be the end of the fight
against impunity, but the beginning. The trial also gave a boost to overall justice reform.
Its success serves as a positive reinforcement of the improvements to date, and the obstacles
met along the way point to concrete objectives for further reform.
The Raboteau trial should also serve as a model, and an inspiration, for efforts to combat
impunity around the world. The dedication of the victims, and the Haitian government's
persistence and innovation in trying new approaches, are transferable to many situations.
The success of the prosecution, especially its quality and its reach to the top military and
paramilitary echelons, is a clear example that even poor countries can achieve justice
through their national systems.
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